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Abstract: In this paper, we develop an evolutionary variational inequality model of the
Internet with multiple classes of traﬃc and demonstrate its utility through the formulation
and solution of a time-dependent Braess paradox. The model can handle time-dependent
changes in demand as a consequence of developing news stories, following, for example,
natural disasters or catastrophes or major media events. The model can also capture the
1time-varying demand for Internet resources during a regular weekday with its more regular
rhythm of work and breaks. In addition, the model includes time-varying capacities on the
route ﬂows due to, for example, government interventions or network-type failures.
21. Introduction
The Internet has revolutionized the way in which we work, interact, and conduct our daily
activities. It has aﬀected the young and the old as they gather information and communicate
and has transformed business processes, ﬁnancial investing and decision-making, and global
supply chains. The Internet has evolved into a network that underpins our developed societies
and economies.
In this paper, we develop a dynamic network model of the Internet that is based on
evolutionary variational inequality theory. The motivation for this research comes from
several directions:
1. The need to develop a dynamic, that is, time-dependent, model of the Internet, as argued,
for example, by computer scientists (see Roughgarden (2005)). For example, the demand for
Internet resources itself is dynamic and, hence, an underpinning modeling framework must
be able to handle time-dependent constraints. Indeed, as noted on page 10 of Roughgarden
(2005), “A network like the Internet is volatile. Its traﬃc patterns can change quickly and
dramatically ... The assumption of a static model is therefore particularly suspect in such
networks.”
2. Analogues have been identiﬁed between transportation networks and telecommunication
networks and, in particular, the Internet, in terms of decentralized decision-making, ﬂows and
costs, and even the Braess paradox, which allows us to take advantage of such a connection
(cf. Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956), Beckmann (1967), Braess (1968), Dafermos
and Sparrow (1969), Dafermos (1972), Cantor and Gerla (1974), Gallager (1977), Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis (1989), Bertsekas and Gallager (1992), Korilis, Lazar, and Orda (1999), and
Boyce, Mahmassani, and Nagurney (2005)).
3. The development of a fundamental dynamic model of the Internet will allow for the
exploration and development of diﬀerent incentive mechanisms, including dynamic tolls and
pricing mechanisms in order to reduce congestion and also aid in the design of a better
Internet, a dynamic network, par excellence.
It has been shown (cf. Roughgarden (2005) and the references therein) that distributed
3routing, which is common in computer networks and, in particular, the Internet, and “selﬁsh”
(or “source” routing in computer networks) routing, as occurs in the case of user-optimized
transportation networks, in which travelers select the minimum cost route between an origin
and destination, are one and the same if the cost functions associated with the links that
make up the paths/routes coincide with the lengths used to deﬁne the shortest paths. In
this paper, we assume that the costs on the links are congestion-dependent, that is, they
depend on the volume of the ﬂow on the link. Note that the cost on a link may represent
travel delay but we utilize “cost” functions since these are more general conceptually than
delay functions and they can include, for example, tolls associated with pricing, etc. Of
course, it is important to also emphasize that, in the case of transportation networks, it
is travelers that make the decisions as to the route selection between origin/destination
(O/D) pairs of nodes, whereas in the case of the Internet, it is algorithms, implemented in
software, that determine the shortest paths. Here we assume that these routing algorithms
are informed about the cost functions associated with the routes and the volumes of ﬂow
on the routes/links in the network and select routes so as to minimize cost. For additional
background on telecommunication networks, see Resende and Pardalos (2006).
The methodology that we will utilize for the formulation and analysis of the Internet is
that of evolutionary variational inequalities. We believe that such a methodology is quite
natural for several reasons. First, historically, ﬁnite-dimensional variational inequality theory
(cf. Dafermos (1980), Nagurney (1993), and the references therein) has been used to general-
ize static transportation network equilibrium models dating to the classic work of Beckmann,
McGuire, and Winsten (1956), which also forms the foundation for selﬁsh routing and de-
centralized decision-making on the Internet (see, e.g., Roughgarden (2005)). Secondly, there
has been much research activity devoted to the development of models for dynamic trans-
portation problems and it makes sense to exploit the connections between transportation
networks and the Internet (see also Nagurney and Dong (2002)). In addition, evolutionary
variational inequalities (EVIs), which are inﬁnite-dimensional, have been used to model a
variety of time-dependent applications, including time-dependent spatial price problems, ﬁ-
nancial network problems, dynamic supply chains, and electric power networks (cf. Daniele,
Maugeri, and Oettli (1999), Daniele (2003, 2004), Daniele (2006), Nagurney et al. (2006),
and Nagurney (2006)).
4In particular, evolutionary variational inequalities (EVIs) were introduced in the 1960s
by Brezis (1967) and Lions and Stampacchia (1967), and have been used in the study of
partial diﬀerential equations and boundary value problems. They are part of the general
theory of variational inequalities, which has developed today into a wide-spanning area of
research with important applications in control theory, optimization, game theory, operations
research, economics, and engineering, notably, in transportation science as well as in logistics
(see, for example, Smith (1979), Dafermos (1980), Florian and Los (1982), Dafermos and
Nagurney (1984), Nagurney (1989), Zhao and Dafermos (1991), Ran and Boyce (1996),
Nagurney and Siokos (1997), and Nagurney (2006), and the references therein). The form
of EVI problem that we consider in this paper in a generalization of the one introduced
by Daniele, Maugeri, and Oettli (1999) to the case of multiple classes of traﬃc. We can
expect that a variety of time-dependent demand structures will occur on the Internet as
individuals seek information and news online in response to major events or simply go about
their daily activities whether at work or at home. Hence, the development of a dynamic
network model of the Internet is timely. The model that we propose can handle not only
time-varying multiclass demands but also time-varying capacities on the multiclass route
ﬂows. The latter we can expect to be useful in the case of decreases in capabilities due
to network failures or imposed bounds on the Internet traﬃc on certain routes, due, for
example, to policy interventions by governments.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the evolutionary varia-
tional inequality formulation of the Internet with a focus on the multiclass ﬂows, multiclass
costs, and equilibria. In particular, we consider that there are diﬀerent classes or “jobs” on
the Internet and that the equilibrium conditions are associated with each class. We also pro-
vide a numerical multiclass dynamic network examples in which the equilibrium trajectories
are computed. In Section 3 we illustrate the novelty of this framework in the context of a
time-dependent Braess (1968) paradox in which the corresponding evolutionary variational
inequalities are explicitly solved.
52. Evolutionary Variational Inequalities and the Internet
We model the Internet as a network G =[ N,L], consisting of the set of nodes N and the set
of directed links L. The set of links L consists of nL elements. The set of origin/destination
(O/D) pairs of nodes is denoted by W and consists of nW elements. We denote the set of
routes (with a route consisting of links) joining the origin/destination (O/D) pair w by Pw.
We assume that the routes are acyclic. We let P with nP elements denote the set of all
routes connecting all the O/D pairs in the Internet. Links are denoted by a,b, etc; routes by
r, q, etc., and O/D pairs by w1, w2, etc. We assume that the Internet is traversed by “jobs”
or “classes” of traﬃc and that there are K “jobs” with a typical job denoted by k.
Let dk
w(t) denote the demand, that is, the traﬃc generated, between O/D pair w at time t
by job class k. The ﬂow on route r at time t of class k, which is assumed to be nonnegative,
is denoted by xk
r(t) and the ﬂow on link a of class k at time t by fk
a(t).
Since the demands over time are assumed known, the following conservation of ﬂow
equations must be satisﬁed at each t:
d
k
w(t)=
X
r∈Pw
x
k
r(t), ∀w ∈ W, ∀k, (1)
that is, the demand associated with an O/D pair and class must be equal to the sum of the
ﬂows of that class on the routes that connect that O/D pair. We assume that the traﬃc
associated with each O/D pair is divisible and can be routed among multiple routes/paths.
Also, we must have that
0 ≤ x
k
r(t) ≤ µ
k
r(t), ∀r ∈ P,∀k, (2)
where µk
r(t) denotes the capacity on route r of class k at time t.
We group the demands at time t of classes for all the O/D pairs into the KnW-dimensional
vector d(t). Similarly, we group all the class route ﬂows at time t into the KnP-dimensional
vector x(t). The upper bounds/capacities on the routes at time t are grouped into the
KnP-dimensional vector µ(t).
The link ﬂows are related to the route ﬂows, in turn, through the following conservation
6of ﬂow equations:
f
k
a(t)=
X
r∈P
x
k
r(t)δar, ∀a ∈ L,∀k, (3)
where δar = 1 if link a is contained in route r, and δar = 0, otherwise. Hence, the ﬂow of a
class on a link is equal to the sum of the ﬂows of the class on routes that contain that link.
All the link ﬂows at time t are grouped into the vector f(t), which is of dimension KnL.
The cost on route r at time t of class k is denoted by Ck
r(t) and the cost on a link a of
class k at time t by ck
a(t).
For the sake of generality, we allow the cost on a link to depend upon the entire vector
of link ﬂows at time t, so that
c
k
a(t)=c
k
a(f(t)), ∀a ∈ L,∀k. (4)
In view of (3), we may write the link costs as a function of route ﬂows, that is,
c
k
a(x(t)) ≡ c
k
a(f(t)), ∀a ∈ L,∀k. (5)
Of course, one special case of (4) would include separable link cost functions in which the
cost on a link of a class depends only upon the ﬂow on that link of that class.
The costs on routes are related to costs on links through the following equations:
C
k
r(x(t)) =
X
a∈L
c
k
a(x(t))δar, ∀r ∈ P,∀k, (6)
that is, the cost on a route of class k at a time t is equal to the sum of costs on links of
that class that make up the route at time t. We group the route costs at time t into the
vector C(t), which is of dimension KnP. Note that the form of (6) also allows such cases as
separable route cost functions in which the cost on a route of a class depends only upon the
ﬂow of traﬃc of that class on that route. Furthermore, (6) captures the case in which the
cost on a route of a class depends on the total volume of traﬃc on a route expressed as the
sum of the ﬂows of all classes on that route (as well as the sums of ﬂows of the classes on
other route(s)).
7We now deﬁne the feasible set K. We consider the Hilbert space L = L2([0,T],R KnP)
(where [0,T] denotes the time interval under consideration) given by
K =
(
x ∈ L
2([0,T],R
KnP):0≤ x(t) ≤ µ(t)a.e. in[0,T];
X
p∈Pw
x
k
p(t)=d
k
w(t),∀w,∀ka.e. in[0,T]
)
. (7)
We assume that the capacities µk
r(t), for all r and k, are in L, and that the demands,
dk
w ≥ 0, for all w and k, are also in L. Further, we assume that
0 ≤ d(t) ≤ Φµ(t),a.e. on[0,T], (8)
where Φ is the KnW × KnP-dimensional O/D pair-route incidence matrix, with element
(kw,kr) equal to 1 if route r is contained in Pw, and 0, otherwise. Here we assume that all
classes can use all the routes. (If there are restrictions then the matrix Φ can be adapted
accordingly.) Due to (8), the feasible set K is nonempty. It is easily seen that K is also convex,
closed, and bounded. Note that we are not restricted as to the form that the time-varying
demands for the O/D pairs take since convexity of K is guaranteed even if the demands have
a step-wise structure, or are piecewise continuous.
The dual space of L will be denoted by L∗.O nL×L ∗ we deﬁne the canonical bilinear
form by
hhG,xii :=
Z T
0
hG(t),x(t)idt, G ∈L
∗,x ∈L . (9)
Furthermore, the cost mapping C : K→L ∗, assigns to each ﬂow trajectory x(·) ∈Kthe
cost trajectory C(x(·)) ∈L ∗.
We are now ready to state the dynamic multiclass network equilibrium conditions govern-
ing the Internet, assuming shortest path routing. In particular, we assume that the traﬃc
associated with each O/D pair and class is selﬁshly routed to minimize the cost incurred
for each class, given the other ﬂows in the network, and subject to the capacity constraints.
These conditions are a generalization of the Wardropian (1952) ﬁrst principle of traﬃc be-
havior (see also, e.g., Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten (1956), Dafermos and Sparrow
8(1969), Dafermos (1972, 1982), and Nagurney (1993)) to include multiple classes, the time
dimension, and capacities on the route ﬂows. Of course, if the capacities are very large
and exceed the demand for a class at each t, then the upper bounds are never attained by
the route ﬂows and the conditions below will collapse, in the case of ﬁxed time t, to the
well-known multiclass static network equilibrium conditions (see Dafermos (1972, 1982) and
the references therein).
Deﬁnition 1: Dynamic Multiclass Network Equilibrium
A multiclass route ﬂow pattern x∗ ∈Kis said to be a dynamic network equilibrium (according
to the generalization of Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle) if, at each time t, only the minimum cost
routes for each class not at their capacities are used (that is, have positive ﬂow) for each
O/D pair unless the ﬂow of that class on a route is at its upper bound (in which case those
class routes’ costs can be lower than those on the routes not at their capacities). The state
can be expressed by the following equilibrium conditions which must hold for every O/D pair
w ∈ W, every route r ∈ Pw, every class k; k =1 ,...,K, and a.e. on [0,T]:
C
k
r(x
∗(t)) − λ
k∗
w (t)

 
 
≤ 0, if xk∗
r (t)=µk
r(t),
=0 , if 0 <x k∗
r (t) <µ k
r(t),
≥ 0, if xk∗
r (t)=0 .
(10)
Hence, conditions (10) state that all utilized routes not at their capacities connecting
an O/D pair have equal and minimal costs at each time t in [0,T], where that minimal
cost is denoted by λk∗
w (t). If a route ﬂow of a class is at its capacity then its cost can
be lower than the minimal cost for that O/D pair and class. Of course, if we have that
µk
r = ∞, for all routes r ∈ P and classes k; k =1 ,...,K, then the dynamic equilibrium
conditions state that all used routes connecting an O/D pair of nodes for a given class have
equal and minimal route costs at each time t. For ﬁxed t, the latter conditions coincide
with a multiclass version of Wardrop’s ﬁrst principle (see Dafermos (1972, 1982)) governing
static transportation network equilibrium problems. Note that this concept, but in the case
of a single class, has also been applied to static models of the Internet (cf. Roughgarden
(2005) and the references therein). We note that El Azouzi (2002) proposed a multiclass
network equilibrium model for telecommunications (including the Internet) but the model is
9subsumed by the model of Dafermos (1982). In addition, that model was static. Here, (10)
includes the time dimension.
The standard form of the EVI that we work with is:
determine x
∗ ∈Ksuch that hhF(x
∗),x− x
∗ii ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K . (11)
We now establish the following theorem.
Theorem 1
x∗ ∈Kis an equilibrium ﬂow according to Deﬁnition 1 if and only if it satisﬁes the evolu-
tionary variational inequality:
Z T
0
hC(x
∗(t)),x(t) − x
∗(t)idt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K . (12)
Proof: We ﬁrst prove that equilibrium conditions (10) imply the evolutionary variational
inequality (12).
Assume that (10) holds. Then
K X
k=1
X
w∈W
X
r∈Pw
C
k
r(x
∗(t))(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t))
=
K X
k=1
X
w∈W




X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))>λk∗
w (t)
C
k
r(x
∗(t))x
k
r(t)+
X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))=λk∗
w (t)
C
k
r(x
∗(t))(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t))
+
X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))<λk∗
w (t)
C
k
r(x
∗(t))(x
k
r(t) − µ
k
r(t))




≥
K X
k=1
X
w∈W




X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))>λk∗
w (t)
λ
k∗
w (t)(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t)) + λ
k∗
w (t)
X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))=λk∗
w (t)
(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t))
10+
X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))<λk∗
w (t)
C
k
r(x
∗(t))(x
k
r(t) − µ
k
r(t))




≥
K X
k=1
X
w∈W



λ
k∗
w (t)
X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))>λk∗
w (t)
(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t)) + λ
k∗
w (t)
X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))=λk∗
w (t)
(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t))
+ λ
k∗
w (t)
X
r∈Pw
Ck
r (x∗(t))<λk∗
w (t)
(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t))




=
K X
k=1
X
w∈W
λ
k∗
w (t)
X
r∈Pw
(x
k
r(t) − x
k∗
r (t)) = 0 a.e in [0,T]. (13)
Hence, (12) is veriﬁed.
We now establish that (12) implies (10). The proof is by contradiction.
First of all let us remark that conditions (10) imply:
∀k, ∀w ∈ W, ∀q,s ∈ Pw if C
k
q(x
∗(t)) <C
k
s(x
∗(t))
then x
k∗
q (t)=µ
k
q(t)o rx
k∗
s (t)=0 .
In fact:
1. if Ck
q(x∗(t)) ≥ λk∗
w (t), then Ck
s(x∗(t)) >λ k∗
w (t) and xk∗
s (t)=0 ;
2. if Ck
q(x∗(t)) <λ k∗
w (t) ≤ Ck
s(x∗(t)), then xk∗
q (t)=µk
q(t);
3. if Ck
q(x∗(t)) <C k
s(x∗(t)) <λ k∗
w (t), then xk∗
q (t)=µq(t).
Assume now that equilibrium conditions (10) do not hold. Then, there exists a k,a
w ∈ W, and routes q,s ∈ Pw together with a set E ⊆ [0,T] having positive measure such
that
C
k
q(x
∗(t)) <C
k
s(x
∗(t)),x
k∗
q (t) <µ
k
q(t),x
k∗
s (t) > 0, a.e. on E. (14)
11For t ∈ E, let δ(t) = min{µk
q(t) − xk∗
q (t),x k∗
s (t)}. Then, δ(t) > 0 a.e. on E, and
we can construct x ∈K , such that xk(t)=xk∗(t) outside E and xk
q(t)=xk∗
q (t)+δ(t),
xk
s(t)=xk∗
s (t) − δ(t), with xk
r(t)=xk
r(t), for r 6= q,s. Substitution of this feasible ﬂow into
hhC(x∗),x− x∗ii yields:
hhC(x
∗),x− x
∗ii =
Z
E
δ(t)(C
k
q(x
∗(t)) − C
k
s(x
∗(t)))dt < 0, (15)
but this is a contradiction to EVI (12) being satisﬁed. 2
Remark 1
It is important to note that in the proof of Theorem 1 we have, in eﬀect, a dynamic version
of the Nash equilibrium concept in that we show that a positive reallocation of δ(t) of ﬂow
from one route to another of a given class will result in a worsened route cost. For a survey of
networking games in telecommunications but in a static framework, see Altman et al. (2005).
Daniele, Maugeri, and Oettli (1999) presented dynamic network equilibrium conditions for
transportation networks but considered only a single class of traﬃc. Here, we state the
dynamic equilibrium conditions in a manner that is more transparent (cf. (10)), noting that
the lower bounds on the route ﬂows on the Internet will be zero. In addition, we generalize
the results of Daniele, Maugeri, and Oettli (1999) to the case of multiple classes. Finally,
the equivalence proof for the EVI formulation is slightly diﬀerent from that contained in the
previous reference, since here we use the equilibrium conditions (10) directly, and also we
now have multiple classes of traﬃc.
We now, for completeness, provide some qualitative properties.
Theorem 2 (cf. Daniele, Maugeri, and Oettli (1999) and Daniele (2006))
If C in (12) satisﬁes any of the following conditions:
1. C is hemicontinuous with respect to the strong topology on K, and there exist A ⊆K
nonempty, compact, and B ⊆Kcompact such that, for every y ∈K\A, there exists
x ∈ B with hhC(x),y− xii < 0;
2. C is hemicontinuous with respect to the weak topology on K;
123. C is pseudomonotone and hemicontinuous along line segments,
then the EVI problem (12) admits a solution over the constraint set K.
Recall that C :→L ∗, where K is convex, is said to be
pseudomonotone if and only if, for all x,y ∈K
hhC(x),y− xii ⇒ hhC(y),x− yii ≤ 0;
hemicontinuous if and only if, for all y ∈K , the function ξ 7→ hhC(ξ),y− ξi is upper
semicontinuous on K;
hemicontinuous along line segments if and only if, for all x,y ∈K , the function ξ 7→
hhC(ξ),y− xii is upper semicontinuous on the line segment [x,y].
Moreover, if C is strictly monotone, then the solution of (12) is unique (see, e.g., Kinder-
lehrer and Stampacchia (1980)).
2.1 A Multiclass Numerical Example
We now present a small multiclass dynamic network equilibrium numerical example.
Consider a network (small subnetwork of the Internet) consisting of two nodes and two
links as in Figure 1. There is a single O/D pair w =( 1 ,2). Since the routes connecting the
O/D pair consist of single links we work with the routes r1 and r2 directly as in Figure 1.
There are assumed to be two classes/jobs and the route costs are:
for Class 1:
C
1
r1(x(t)) = 2x
1
r1(t)+x
2
r1(t)+5 ,C
1
r2(x(t)) = 2x
2
r2(t)+2 x
1
r2(t)+1 0 ,
for Class 2:
C
2
r1(x(t)) = x
2
r1(t)+x
1
r1(t)+5 ,C
2
r2(x(t)) = x
1
r2(t)+2 x
2
r2(t)+5 .
13m
m
2
1
12
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Figure 1: Network Structure of the Multiclass Numerical Example
The time horizon is [0,10]. The demands for the O/D pair are:
d
1
w(t)=1 0− t, d
2
w(t)=t.
The upper bounds are: µ1
r1 = µ1
r2 = µ1
r1 = µ2
r2 = ∞.
To solve the associated evolutionary variational inequality, we utilize the approach set
forth in Cojocaru, Daniele, and Nagurney (2005 a, b), in which the time horizon T is dis-
cretized and the corresponding variational inequality (or, equivalently, projected dynamical
system) at each discrete point in time is then solved. Due to the simplicity of the network
structure, we can easily obtain such solutions by solving the equilibrium conditions (10)
explicitly at the discrete time points.
Obviously, this procedure is correct if the continuity of the solution is guaranteed. Conti-
nuity results for solutions to evolutionary variational inequalities, in the case where F(x(t)) =
A(t)x(t)+B(t) is a linear operator, A(t) is a continuous and positive deﬁnite matrix in [0,T],
and B(t) is a continuous vector can be found in Barbagallo (2005). Of course, the examples
could also be computed via the computational procedure given in Daniele, Maugeri, and
Oettli (1999) but here we utilize a time-discretization approach which also has intuitive ap-
peal. In Table 1 we provide the equilibrium solutions for the multiclass network equilibrium
example at discrete points in time.
In Figure 2, we provide a graph of the equilibrium route trajectories, where we display
also the interpolations between the discrete solutions given in Table 1. Since the route cost
functions are strictly monotone over the time horizon [0,10] we know that the equilibrium
trajectories are unique. Moreover, as the theory predicts, the trajectories are also continuous
14Table 1: Equilibrium Route Flows for the Multiclass Numerical Example
Equilibrium Multiclass Route Flows at time t
Flow t =0 t =2 .5 t =5 t =7 .5 t =1 0
x1∗
r1(t) 6.25 6.25 5.00 2.50 0.00
x1∗
r2(t) 3.75 1.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
x2∗
r1(t) 0.00 0.00 1. ¯ 66 4.1 ¯ 66 6. ¯ 66
x2∗
r2(t) 0.00 2.50 3. ¯ 33 3. ¯ 33 3. ¯ 33
for this example. It is interesting to see that after time t = 5 route r2 is never used by class
1, whereas route r1 is not utilized for class 2 traﬃc until after t =2 .
For completeness, we also provide the following class O/D pair minimum costs at times
t =0 ,2.5,5,7.5 and 10:
λ
1∗
w (0) = 17.50,λ
1∗
w (2.5) = 17.50,λ
1∗
w (5) = 16. ¯ 66,λ
1∗
w (7.5) = 14.1 ¯ 66,λ
1∗
w (10) = 11. ¯ 66
and
λ
2∗
w (0) = 8.75,λ
2∗
w (2.5) = 11.25,λ
2∗
w (5) = 11. ¯ 66,λ
2∗
w (7.5) = 11. ¯ 66,λ
2∗
w (10) = 11. ¯ 66.
Remark 2
It is easy to verify that if the ﬁrst cost term in Cr1 is changed from “2” to “1” then there
are multiple equilibria.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Trajectories for the Multiclass Numerical Example
3. Evolutionary Variational Inequalities and the Braess Paradox
We further reinforce the elegance and power of the evolutionary variational inequality
model for the Internet as we revisit the Braess (1968) paradox (see also, Boyce, Mahmassani,
and Nagurney (2005) and Braess, Nagurney, and Wakolbinger (2005)). Examples of the
Braess paradox, originally formulated for transportation networks, have occurred in cities
such as New York as well as Stuttgart. In addition, the Braess paradox has been noted to
occur not only in transportation networks but also in telecommunication networks, including
the Internet.
Recall that in the Braess paradox, which is an example of a ﬁxed demand network equi-
librium problem, the addition of a new link, which yields a new route, makes all the “users”
in the network worse oﬀ. As emphasized in Korilis, Lazar, and Orda (1999), this is also rel-
evant to the Internet. We present an evolutionary variational inequality formulation which
deepens the understanding of the Braess paradox and also illustrates dramatically the im-
portance of time-varying demands and the associated equilibrium ﬂows and costs in what
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Figure 3: The Time-Dependent Braess Network Example with Relevance to the Internet
are increasingly becoming known as noncooperative networks. We assume, hence, that there
is a single class k and we supress the superscript k in the notation below.
The Time-Dependent Braess Paradox
Assume a network as the ﬁrst network depicted in Figure 3 in which there are four nodes:
1,2,3,4; four links: a,b,c,d; and a single O/D pair w =( 1 ,4). There are, hence, two routes
available between this O/D pair: r1 =( a,c) and r2 =( b,d).
The networks given in Figure 3 are due to Braess (1968). We now construct time-
dependent link costs, route costs, and demand for t ∈ [0,T]. It is important to emphasize
that the case where time t is discrete, that is, t =0 ,1,2,...,T, is trivially included in
the equilibrium conditions (10) and also captured in the evolutionary variational inequality
formulation (12).
We consider, to start, the ﬁrst network in Figure 3, consisting of links: a,b,c,d.W e
assume that the capacities µr1(t)=µr2(t)=∞ for all t ∈ [0,T]. The link cost functions are
assumed to be given and as follows for time t ∈ [0,T]:
ca(fa(t)) = 10fa(t),c b(fb(t)) = fb(t)+5 0 ,
cc(fc(t)) = fc(t)+5 0 ,c d(fd(t)) = 10fd(t).
17We assume a time-varying demand dw(t)=t for t ∈ [0,T].
Observe that at time t =6 ,dw(6) = 6, and it is easy to verify that the equilibrium route
ﬂows at time t = 6 are:
x
∗
r1(6) = 3,x
∗
r2(6) = 3,
the equilibrium link ﬂows are:
f
∗
a(6) = 3,f
∗
b (6) = 3,f
∗
c(6) = 3,f
∗
d(6) = 3,
with associated equilibrium route costs:
Cr1(6) = ca(6) + cc(6) = 83,C r2 = cb(6) + cd(6) = 83,
and, hence, equilibrium condition (10) is satisﬁed for time t = 6. This is the solution to the
classical (static) Braess (1968) network without the route addition.
We now construct and solve EVI (12) for the dynamic network equilibrium problem over
t ∈ [0,T]. We ﬁrst express the route costs in terms of route ﬂows for Network 1 in Figure 3,
where we have that, because of the conservation of ﬂow equations (3), fa(t)=fc(t)=xr1(t)
and fb(t)=fd(t)=xr2(t). That is, we must have that
Cr1(t)=1 1 xr1(t)+5 0 ,C r2(t)=1 1 xr2(t)+5 0 ,
with the route conservation of ﬂow equations (1) yielding:
dw(t)=t = xr1(t)+xr2(t),
and, hence, we may write
xr2(t)=t − xr1(t).
Similarly, we must have, because of the feasible set K (cf. (7)), the simplicity of the
network topology, and the cost structure, that
x
∗
r1(t)=x
∗
r2(t). (16)
Hence, we may write EVI (12) for this problem as: determine x∗ ∈Ksatisfying
Z T
0
(11x
∗
r1(t)+50)×(xr1(t)−x
∗
r1(t))+(11x
∗
r2(t)+50)×(xr2(t)−x
∗
r2(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K , (17)
18which, in view of (16), can be expressed as:
Z T
0
(11x
∗
r1(t)+50)×(xr1(t)−x
∗
r1(t))+(11(t−x
∗
r1(t))×(xr1(t)−x
∗
r1(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K , (18)
which, after algebraic simpliﬁcation, is
Z T
0
(22x
∗
r1(t) − 11t) × (xr1(t) − x
∗
r1(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K . (19)
But, (19) implies that:
22x
∗
r1(t)=1 1 t; fort ∈ [0,T]
or
x
∗
r1(t)=
t
2
.
Hence, we also have that x∗
r2(t)= t
2.
Moreover, the equilibrium route costs for t ∈ [0,T] are given by:
Cr1(x
∗
r1(t)) = 5
1
2
t +5 0=Cr2(x
∗
r2(t)) = 5
1
2
t +5 0 ,
and, clearly, equilibrium conditions (10) hold for ∈ [0,T] a.e.
Assume now that, as depicted in Figure 3, a new link “e”, joining node 2 to node 3 is
added to the original network, with cost ce(fe(t)) = fe(t)+10 for t ∈ [0,T]. The addition of
this link creates a new route r3 =( a,e,d) that is available for the Internet traﬃc. Assume
that the time-varying demand is still given by dw(t)=t. Note, that for t = 6, for example,
the original equilibrium ﬂow distribution pattern xr1(6) = 3 and xr2(6) = 3 is no longer an
equilibrium pattern, since at this level of ﬂow the cost on route r3, Cr3(6) = 70. Hence, the
traﬃc from routes r1 and r2 would be switched to route r3.
The equilibrium ﬂow pattern at time t = 6 on the new network (which would correspond
to the classic Braess paradox in a static network equilibrium setting) is:
x
∗
r1(6) = 2,x
∗
r2(6) = 2,x
∗
r3(6) = 2,
with equilibrium link ﬂows:
f
∗
a(6) = 4,f
∗
b (6) = 2,f
∗
c(6) = 2,f
∗
e(6) = 2,f
∗
d(6) = 4,
19and with associated equilibrium route costs:
Cr1(6) = 92,C r2(6) = 92,C r3(6) = 92.
Indeed, one can verify that any reallocation of the route ﬂows would yield a higher cost on
a route.
Note that, with the route addition, the cost at time t = 6 increased for every “user” of the
network from 83 to 92 without a change in the demand or traﬃc rate! This is the classical
Braess paradox.
We now solve the evolutionary variational inequality problem (12) for the second network
in Figure 3 over the time interval [0,T] to create the time-dependent Braess paradox.
We may write the route costs for the second network (after the route addition) in Figure
3 as a function of the time-dependent route ﬂows, that is,
Cr1(x(t)) = 11xr1(t)+1 0 xr3(t)+5 0 ,C r2(x(t)) = 11xr2(t)+1 0 xr3(t)+5 0 ,
and
Cr3(x(t)) = 10xr1(t)+2 1 xr3(t)+1 0 xr2(t)+1 0 .
EVI (12) now takes the form: determine x∗ ∈K(where K is now expanded to include
route r3; see (7)), so that
Z T
0
(11x
∗
r1(t)+10x
∗
r3(t)+50)×(xr1(t)−x
∗
r1(t))+(11x
∗
r2(t)+10x
∗
r3(t)+50)×(xr2(t)−x
∗
r2(t))
+(10x
∗
r1(t)+2 1 x
∗
r3(t)+1 0 x
∗
r2(t)+1 0 )× (xr3 − x
∗
r3(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K . (20)
Because of the feasible set K, we must have that
xr3(t)=t − xr1(t) − xr2(t) and x
∗
r3(t)=t − x
∗
r1(t) − x
∗
r2(t). (21)
Substitution of (21) into (20), after algebraic simpliﬁcation, yields
Z T
0
(x
∗
r1(t) − 11(t − x
∗
r1(t) − x
∗
r2(t)) − 10x
∗
r2(t)+4 0 )× (xr1(t) − x
∗
r1(t))
20+(x
∗
r2(t) − 11(t − x
∗
r1(t) − x
∗
r2(t)) − 10x
∗
r2(t) + 40) × (xr2(t) − x
∗
r2(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K . (22)
Now, since it is clear (because of the network topology and cost structure) that x∗
r1(t)=
x∗
r2(t) we can simplify EVI (22) further to:
Z T
0
(13x
∗
r1(t) − 11t + 40) × ((xr1(t)+xr2(t)) − 2x
∗
r1(t))dt ≥ 0, ∀x ∈K . (23)
We now analyze (23). In particular, we consider the term:
(13x
∗
r1(t) − 11t + 40) × (xr1(t)+xr2(t) − 2x
∗
r1(t)) (24)
for a ﬁxed t and analyze when its value is greater than or equal to zero. We note that
if x∗
r1(t) = 0, then for this term to be greater than or equal to zero, we must have that
−11t +4 0≥ 0, or t ∈
￿
0,3
7
11
￿
. We, hence, obtain that:
x
∗
r1(t)=x
∗
r2(t)=0 ,x
∗
r3(t)=t, fort ∈
￿
0,3
7
11
￿
. (25)
On the other hand, if x∗
r1(t) > 0, we must consider the situation that either x∗
r3(t) is also
greater than zero or it is equal to zero. We ﬁrst consider the case that x∗
r3(t) = 0. Then,
we know that x
∗
r1(t)=x
∗
r2(t)=
t
2
. Substitution of this expression for x∗
r1(t) into (24), states
that this value is valid for t ∈
￿
8
1
9
,∞
￿
.
In the range for t ∈
￿
3
7
11
,8
8
9
￿
we obtain that:
x
∗
r1(t)=x
∗
r2(t)=
11
13
t −
40
13
,x
∗
r3(t)=−
9
16
t +
43
8
. (26)
Remark 3
For both networks in Figure 3, with the associated link and route cost functions, it is easy to
verify that the corresponding vector of route costs C(x) is strictly monotone in route ﬂows
x, that is,
hhC(x
1) − C(x
2),x
1 − x
2ii > 0, ∀x
1,x
2 ∈K ,x
1 6= x
2,
21since the Jacobian of the route costs is strictly diagonally dominant at each t and, thus,
positive deﬁnite. Hence, the corresponding equilibrium route ﬂow solutions x∗(t) will be
unique.
In summary, we have identiﬁed three regimes, denoted by I, II, and III, respectively, and
depicted in Figure 4, where: for dw(t)=t ∈
￿
0,t 1 =3
7
11
￿
(Regime I):
x
∗
r1(t)=x
∗
r2(t)=0 ,x
∗
r3(t)=dw(t)=t;
for dw(t)=t ∈
￿
t1 =3
7
11
,8
8
9
￿
(Regime II), we have that:
x
∗
r1(t)=x
∗
r2(t)=
11
13
t −
40
13
,x
∗
r3(t)=−
9
16
t +
43
8
.
Finally, for dw(t)=t ∈
￿
t2 =8
8
9
,T <∞
￿
(Regime III), we have that:
x
∗
r1(t)=x
∗
r2(t)=
dr1(t)
2
=
t
2
,x
∗
r3(t)=0 .
The curves of equilibria are depicted in Figure 4.
Clearly, one can see from Figure 4, that in the range
￿
0,t 1 =3
7
11
￿
, that is, in Regime I
(once the demand is positive), only the new route r3 would be used. Hence, at a relatively
low level of demand, up to a value of 3
7
11
, only the new route is used. In the range of
demands:
￿
3
7
11
,8
8
9
￿
, that is, Regime II, all three routes are used, and in this range the
Braess paradox occurs. Finally, once the demand (recall that dw(t)=t here) exceeds 8
8
9
and we are in Regime III, then the new route is never used! Thus, the use of an evolutionary
variational inequality formulation reveals that over time the Braess paradox is even more
profound and the addition of a new route may result in the route never being used. Finally,
if the demand lies within a particular range, then the addition of a new route may result
in everyone being worse oﬀ, since it results in higher costs than before the route/link was
added to the network.
In particular, the “classical” Braess paradox, in which the addition of the route makes the
“travel” cost higher for everyone, always occurs in Regime II. In order to ﬁnd the minimal
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Trajectories of the Braess Network with Time-Dependent Demands
demand at which the Braess paradox occurs, we note that in the ﬁrst network in Figure 3, the
demand will always equally distribute itself. Hence, on the original network, the equilibrium
ﬂow pattern on each route would be given by
dw(t)
2
=
t
2
for t ∈ [0,T] with a minimal route
cost over the horizon being, thus, equal to: 11
￿t
2
￿
+50. Consider now, the second network
in Figure 3. We know that in Regime I, only the new route would be used, assuming shortest
path routing, with the minimal route cost, hence, being given by the expression in this range
of demands as 21t + 10. Setting now, 11
￿t
2
￿
+ 50 = 21t + 10, and solving for t, which, is
also in this problem equal to the demand, dw(t), yields t =2
18
31
=2 .58. For demand in the
range 2.58 <d w(t)=t<8
8
9
=8 .89, the addition of the new route will result in everyone
being worse oﬀ. See Figure 5.
Pas and Principio (1997) obtained precisely this result but using a static formulation
and in the context of transportation networks. The evolutionary variational inequality for-
mulation provides a compact form for uncovering the time-dependent paradoxical results.
Moreover, since the vector of route costs is strictly monotone, as argued above, we know
that the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality (12) is unique and so the curve of
23-
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24equilibria is unique, as depicted in Figure 4. Furthermore, we can see, as the theory predicts,
that the equilibrium trajectories (cf. Figure 4) are continuous.
Nagurney (2006) also presented this time-dependent Braess paradox but in the context
of dynamic transportation network equilibrium problems. Here, we provide the complete,
explicit, solution of the EVI formulations for Network 1 and for Network 2. Arnott, De
Palma, and Lindsey (1993), motivated by the Braess paradox, presented a paradox in the
context of a dynamic transportation network equilibrium problem in which the routes are
ﬁxed but users decide when to travel, and, hence, the demand is also dynamic. Their focus
was, however, on queues and expanding capacity in a particular network and did not make
use of evolutionary variational inequality theory.
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